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    *Honorable Jane A. Restani, Chief Judge,  United States Court of International Trade,
sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                              
No. 05-5493
                              
MARGARITO MENDOZA,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES;
SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY;
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Respondent
                              
On Petition for Review of an Order of
The Board of Immigration Appeals
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Walter A. Durling
(No. A35-881-814)
                              
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 28, 2006
Before: McKEE, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges
and RESTANI,* Chief Judge
(Opinion filed :  October 5, 2006)
 
    1The INS’s functions are now carried out by the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement of the Department of Homeland Security.
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OPINION
                              
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
Margarito Mendoza, a native and citizen of Trinidad and Tobago, has been living
in the United States as a lawful permanent resident since 1977.  In June 2000, the then
Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”)1 began removal proceedings against
Mendoza on the basis of his 1999 conviction for a firearms offense.  Mendoza admitted
removability and asked for discretionary cancellation of removal.  At his merits hearing in
October 2000, Mendoza alerted the Immigration Judge to a pending indictment for a
controlled substance offense and asked that the hearing be continued.  The Immigration
Judge declined, stating that he would consider the indictment as a factor in his decision
but that he would rather not continue the proceeding given that no one knew when or
whether the controlled substance charge would be prosecuted.  At the conclusion of the
merits hearing, the Immigration Judge granted cancellation of removal.
In July 2001, Mendoza was convicted of the controlled substance offense, and the
INS began removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  Mendoza conceded
removability but challenged the proceedings on res judicata grounds, arguing that the
Immigration Judge had already considered and granted cancellation of removal in spite of
    2We have jurisdiction to review final orders of removal of the BIA under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252.  We review the Board’s conclusions of law de novo.  Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d
241, 251 (3d Cir. 2006).
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his indictment for the controlled substance offense in the October 2000 removal
proceeding.  The Immigration Judge determined that res judicata was inapplicable and
ordered Mendoza’s removal.  He appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”),
and his appeal was denied on the merits.  This petition for review follows.2
In appropriate circumstances we apply the doctrine of res judicata to
administrative agencies acting in a judicial capacity.  United States v. Utah Constr. &
Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966).  Res judicata includes both claim and issue
preclusion.  Venuto v. Witco Corp., 117 F.3d 754, 758 n.5 (3d Cir. 1997).  Because
Mendoza does not specify which of the two he believes applies, we analyze both.
“[C]laim preclusion prohibits litigants from pursuing a matter that has not
previously been litigated but which should have been addressed in an earlier suit.” 
General Elec. Co. v. Deutz AG, 270 F.3d 144, 158 n.5 (3d Cir. 2001).  The question of
whether claim preclusion operates to force the Government to join all extant grounds for
removal in one proceeding is complicated and unsettled because of the quasi-criminal
nature of removal actions.  See Johnson v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 164, 172 n.10 (2d Cir.
2004).  We need not address the question in this case, as the INS could not have joined its
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) claim for removal in the 2000 removal proceeding because
Mendoza had not yet been convicted of a controlled substance offense.  Under the statute,
4an alien only becomes subject to removal once he is convicted of a controlled substance
offense.  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (“Any alien who at any time after admission has
been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or
regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled
substance . . . is deportable”) (emphasis added).  Because Mendoza’s removability on the
basis of his controlled substance conviction could not have been litigated in the 2000
removal proceeding, the BIA correctly held that claim preclusion does not prevent the
Department of Homeland Security from litigating the issue now. 
Issue preclusion “refers to the effect of a judgment in foreclosing further
adjudication of a matter actually decided.”  Gen. Elec., 270 F.3d at 158 n.5.  Here,
Mendoza claims that his removability on the basis of his controlled substance violation
was determined in the 2000 removal proceeding.  The Immigration Judge in that
proceeding, however, explicitly stated that he was not deciding whether a future
conviction for the controlled substance charge would render Mendoza removable, nor
could he have done so given that removability only attaches upon conviction.  Appellant’s
App. Vol. I 3 (“[I]f [Mendoza] is convicted [of the controlled substances offense] and the
[INS] believes that it is a violation of immigration laws, [it has] every right to . . . arrest
him and turn him back into the system and proceed at that point.”) (Transcript of October
25, 2000 merits hearing) (statement of Judge Durling); see also 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  Mendoza’s confusion seems to arise from the Immigration Judge’s
statement that he would consider the charges against Mendoza as a factor in determining
5whether to cancel removal on the basis of the weapons conviction.  This consideration,
however, was entirely proper; immigration judges are authorized to consider allegations
of criminal conduct when deciding whether to grant a discretionary remedy such as
cancellation of removal.  In re Thomas, 21 I&N Dec. 20, 23 (BIA 1995).  This
consideration, however, is different from the Government initiating a formal removal
proceeding once such allegations result in a conviction, and has no preclusive effect on
such a proceeding.
Given that neither claim nor issue preclusion prevents the Government from
seeking to remove Mendoza on the basis of his July 2001 controlled substance conviction,
the petition for review is denied.
